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basic predicate

  • 1 базисный предикат

    Русско-английский словарь по электронике > базисный предикат

  • 2 базисный предикат

    Русско-английский словарь по радиоэлектронике > базисный предикат

  • 3 predykat podstawowy

    • basic predicate

    Słownik polsko-angielski dla inżynierów > predykat podstawowy

  • 4 базисный предикат

    Русско-английский научно-технический словарь Масловского > базисный предикат

  • 5 базисный предикат

    Mathematics: basic predicate

    Универсальный русско-английский словарь > базисный предикат

  • 6 ὑπάρχω

    ὑπάρχω impf. ὑπῆρχον; fut. ὑπάρξω LXX; 1 aor. 3 sg. ὑπῆρξεν (Hom.+) the basic idea: come into being fr. an originating point and so take place; gener. ‘inhere, be there’.
    ① to really be there, exist, be present, be at one’s disposal (Pind., Aeschyl., Hdt.+) μηδενὸς αἰτίου ὑπάρχοντος since there is no good reason Ac 19:40. Cp. 27:21; 28:18; be somewhere 4:34; 10:12; 17:27; Phil 3:20; 1 Cl 61:2; EpilMosq 3 (TestAbr A p. 5, 23 [Stone p. 12] ἐν τῆ σκηνῇ; Just., A I, 29, 1 ἐν σώματι). ἀκούω σχίσματα ἐν ὑμῖν ὑπάρχειν I hear that there are actually divisions among you 1 Co 11:18. εἷς Χριστὸς Ἰησοῦς καὶ ἄλλος οὐκ ὑπάρχει there is only one Christ Jesus and no other AcPl Ha 1, 18. σιγῆς ὑπαρχούσης 7, 25 (s. σιγή). W. dat. of pers. ὑπάρχει μοί τι someth. is at my disposal, I have someth. (X., An. 2, 2, 11; PMagd 9, 2 [III B.C.] ὑπάρχει ἐμοὶ Ἰσιεῖον; Sir 20:16; Jos., Ant. 7, 148) χρυσίον οὐχ ὑπάρχει μοι Ac 3:6. Cp. 4:37; 28:7; 2 Pt 1:8. τὰ ὑπάρχοντά τινι what belongs to someone, someone’s property, possessions, means (SIG 646, 25 [170 B.C.]; very oft. in pap since PHib 94, 2; 15; 95, 12 [III B.C.]; Tob 4:7; TestAbr A 8 p. 86, 7 [Stone p. 20]; Jos., Ant. 4, 261) Lk 8:3; 12:15; Ac 4:32. Subst. in the same sense τὰ ὑπάρχοντά τινος (SIG 611, 14; very oft. in pap since PHib 32, 5; 84, 9; PEleph 2, 3 [III B.C.]; Gen 31:18; Sir 41:1; Tob 1:20 BA; TestAbr A 4 p. 81, 28 [Stone p. 10]) Mt 19:21; 24:47; 25:14; Lk 11:21; 12:33, 44; 14:33; 16:1; 19:8; 1 Cor 13:3; Hb 10:34.
    ② to be in a state or circumstance, be as a widely used substitute in H. Gk. for εἶναι, but in some of the foll. pass. the sense ‘be inherently (so)’ or ‘be really’ cannot be excluded (s. 1; cp. IG XIV, 2014, 3 ἄνθρωπος ὑπάρχων=‘being mortal’) (B-D-F §414, 1; s. Rob. 1121) w. a predicate noun (OGI 383, 48 [I B.C.] ὅπως οὗτος … ὑπάρχῃ καθιδρυμένος; TestAbr A 4 p. 80, 26 [Stone p. 8] ἐνδοξότερος ὑπάρχει βασιλέων; ibid. B 2 p. 105, 9 [St. p. 58] ὑπῆρχεν … γηραλέος πάνυ τῇ ἰδέᾳ; JosAs 7:11 cod. A [p. 48, 12 Bat.] εἰ θυγάτηρ ὑμῶν ἐστι καὶ παρθένος ὑπάρχει … ; SibOr 3, 267, Fgm. 1, 28; Ar. 13, 6; Just., A I, 4, 1; Tat. 60, 2) οὗτος ἄρχων τῆς συναγωγῆς ὑπῆρχεν Lk 8:41. ἐγὼ λειτουργὸς ὑπάρχω τοῦ θεοῦ I am a minister of God GJs 23:1. Cp. Lk 9:48; Ac 7:55; 8:16; 16:3; 19:31 D (w. φίλος and dat., the standard form, s. ins Larfeld I 500); 36; 21:20; 1 Cor 7:26; 12:22; Js 2:15; 2 Pt 3:11; 1 Cl 19:3 and oft.; MPol 6:2. Very freq. in the ptc. w. a predicate noun who is, since he is, etc. (TestSim 4:4 ἐλεήμων ὑπάρχων; Just., A II, 2, 10; Tat. 2, 2; Mel., P. 54, 396) οἱ Φαρισαῖοι φιλάργυροι ὑπάρχοντες Lk 16:14. Cp. 11:13 (v.l. ὄντες); 23:50; Ac 2:30; 3:2; 16:20, 37; 17:24, 29; 22:3; 27:12; Ro 4:19; 1 Cor 11:7; 2 Cor 8:17; 12:16; Gal 1:14; 2:14; 2 Pt 2:19; 1 Cl 1:1; 11:1, 2; 25:2; B 5:10.—ὑπ. w. a prep.: ἐν (Jer 4:14; Philo, Leg. All. 1, 62; Jos., Ant. 7, 391; Just., D. 69, 7 ἐν λώβῃ τινὶ σώματος ὑπάρχων): οἱ ἐν ἱματισμῷ ἐνδόξῳ ὑπάρχοντες Lk 7:25; cp. 16:23; Ac 5:4; 14:9 D; Phil 2:6; 1 Cl 1:3; 32:2; 56:1. τοῦτο πρὸς τῆς ὑμετέρας σωτηρίας ὑπάρχει Ac 27:34 (s. πρός 1).—Schmidt, Syn. II 538–41. DELG s.v. ἄρχω p. 121. M-M. Sv.

    Ελληνικά-Αγγλικά παλαιοχριστιανική Λογοτεχνία > ὑπάρχω

  • 7 ὡς

    ὡς (Hom.+; loanw. in rabb.) relative adv. of the relative pron. ὅς. It is used as
    ① a comparative particle, marking the manner in which someth. proceeds, as, like
    ⓐ corresponding to οὕτως=‘so, in such a way’: σωθήσεται, οὕτως ὡς διὰ πυρός he will be saved, (but only) in such a way as (one, in an attempt to save oneself, must go) through fire (and therefore suffer fr. burns) 1 Cor 3:15. τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γυναῖκα οὕτως ἀγαπάτω ὡς ἑαυτόν Eph 5:33; cp. vs. 28. ἡμέρα κυρίου ὡς κλέπτης οὕτως ἔρχεται 1 Th 5:2. The word οὕτως can also be omitted ἀσφαλίσασθε ὡς οἴδατε make it as secure as you know how = as you can Mt 27:65. ὡς οὐκ οἶδεν αὐτός (in such a way) as he himself does not know = he himself does not know how, without his knowing (just) how Mk 4:27. ὡς ἀνῆκεν (in such a way) as is fitting Col 3:18. Cp. 4:4; Eph 6:20; Tit 1:5 (cp. Just., A I, 3, 1 ὡς πρέπον ἐστίν). ὡς πᾶσα γυνὴ γεννᾷ GJs 11:2; ὡς ἀπεκαλύφθη AcPlCor 1:8.
    ⓑ special uses
    α. in ellipses (TestAbr A 12 p. 90, 22 [Stone p. 28] θρόνος … ἐξαστράπτων ὡς πῦρ; TestJob 20:3 χρήσασθαι … ὡς ἐβούλετο; JosAs 12:7 πρὸς σὲ κατέφυγον ὡς παιδίον ἐπὶ τὸν πατέρα) ἐλάλουν ὡς νήπιος I used to speak as a child (is accustomed to speak) 1 Cor 13:11a; cp. bc; Mk 10:15; Eph 6:6a; Phil 2:22; Col 3:22. ὡς τέκνα φωτὸς περιπατεῖτε walk as (is appropriate for) children of light Eph 5:8; cp. 6:6b. ὡς ἐν ἡμέρᾳ as (it is one’s duty to walk) in the daylight Ro 13:13. The Israelites went through the Red Sea ὡς διὰ ξηρᾶς γῆς as (one travels) over dry land Hb 11:29. οὐ λέγει ὡς ἐπὶ πολλῶν ἀλλʼ ὡς ἐφʼ ἑνός he speaks not as one would of a plurality (s. ἐπί 8), but as of a single thing Gal 3:16.—Ro 15:15; 1 Pt 5:3. Also referring back to οὕτως (GrBar 6:16 ὡς γὰρ τὰ δίστομα οὕτως καὶ ὁ ἀλέκτωρ μηνύει τοῖς ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ like articulate beings the rooster informs earth’s inhabitants) οὕτως τρέχω ὡς οὐκ ἀδήλως I run as (a person) with a fixed goal 1 Cor 9:26a. Cp. ibid. b; Js 2:12.
    β. ὡς and the words that go w. it can be the subj. or obj., of a clause: γενηθήτω σοι ὡς θέλεις let it be done (= it will be done) for you as you wish Mt 15:28. Cp. 8:13; Lk 14:22 v.l. (for ὅ; cp. ὡς τὸ θέλημά σου OdeSol 11:21). The predicate belonging to such a subj. is to be supplied in οὐχ ὡς ἐγὼ θέλω (γενηθήτω) Mt 26:39a.—ἐποίησεν ὡς προσέταξεν αὐτῷ ὁ ἄγγελος he did as (= that which) the angel commanded him (to do) Mt 1:24; cp. 26:19 (on the structure s. RPesch, BZ 10, ’66, 220–45; 11, ’67, 79–95; cp. the formula Job 42:9 and the contrasting negation Ex 1:17; s. also Ex 3:21f); 28:15.—Practically equivalent to ὅ, which is a v.l. for it Mk 14:72 (JBirdsall, NovT 2, ’58, 272–75; cp. Lk 14:22 above).
    γ. ἕκαστος ὡς each one as or according to what Ro 12:3; 1 Cor 3:5; 7:17ab; Rv 22:12. ὡς ἦν δυνατὸς ἕκαστος each person interpreted them as best each could Papias (2:16).
    δ. in indirect questions (X., Cyr. 1, 5, 11 ἀπαίδευτοι ὡς χρὴ συμμάχοις χρῆσθαι) ἐξηγοῦντο ὡς ἐγνώσθη αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ κλάσει τοῦ ἄρτου they told how he had made himself known to them when they broke bread together Lk 24:35. Cp. Mk 12:26 v.l. (for πῶς); Lk 8:47; 23:55; Ac 10:38; 20:20; Ro 11:2; 2 Cor 7:15.
    ② a conjunction marking a point of comparison, as. This ‘as’ can have a ‘so’ expressly corresponding to it or not, as the case may be; further, both sides of the comparison can be expressed in complete clauses, or one or even both may be abbreviated.
    ⓐ ὡς is correlative w. οὕτως=so. οὕτως … ὡς (so, in such a way) … as: οὐδέποτε ἐλάλησεν οὕτως ἄνθρωπος ὡς οὗτος λαλεῖ ὁ ἄνθρωπος J 7:46. ὡς … οὕτως Ac 8:32 (Is 53:7); 23:11; Ro 5:15 (ὡς τὸ παράπτωμα, οὕτως καὶ τὸ χάρισμα, both halves to be completed), 18. ὡς κοινωνοί ἐστε τῶν παθημάτων, οὕτως καὶ τῆς παρακλήσεως as you are comrades in suffering, so (shall you be) in comfort as well 2 Cor 1:7. Cp. 7:14; 11:3 v.l.—ὡς … καί as … so (Plut., Mor. 39e; Ath. 15, 2) Mt 6:10; Ac 7:51; 2 Cor 13:2; Gal 1:9; Phil 1:20.
    ⓑ The clause beginning w. ὡς can easily be understood and supplied in many cases; when this occurs, the noun upon which the comparison depends can often stand alone, and in these cases ὡς acts as a particle denoting comparison. οἱ δίκαιοι ἐκλάμψουσιν ὡς ὁ ἥλιος the righteous will shine out as the sun (shines) Mt 13:43. ὡς ἐπὶ λῃστὴν ἐξήλθατε συλλαβεῖν με as (one goes out) against a robber, (so) you have gone out to arrest me 26:55 (Mel., P. 79, 574 ὡς ἐπὶ φόνιον λῄστην). γίνεσθε φρόνιμοι ὡς οἱ ὄφεις be (as) wise as serpents (are) 10:16b. Cp. Lk 12:27; 21:35; 22:31; J 15:6; 2 Ti 2:17; 1 Pt 5:8.
    ⓒ Semitic infl. is felt in the manner in which ὡς, combined w. a subst., takes the place of a subst. or an adj.
    α. a substantive
    א. as subj. (cp. Da 7:13 ὡς υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου ἤρχετο; cp. 10:16, 18) ἐνώπιον τοῦ θρόνου (ἦν) ὡς θάλασσα ὑαλίνη before the throne there was something like a sea of glass Rv 4:6. Cp. 8:8; 9:7a. ἀφʼ ἑνὸς ἐγενήθησαν ὡς ἡ ἄμμος from one man they have come into being as the sand, i.e. countless descendants Hb 11:12.
    ב. as obj. (JosAs 17:6 εἶδεν Ἀσενὲθ ὡς ἅρμα πυρός) ᾂδουσιν ὡς ᾠδὴν καινήν they were singing, as it were, a new song Rv 14:3. ἤκουσα ὡς φωνήν I heard what sounded like a shout 19:1, 6abc; cp. 6:1.
    β. as adjective, pred. (mostly εἶναι, γίνεσθαι ὡς; the latter also in rendering of ךְּ to express the basic reality of something: GDelling, Jüd. Lehre u. Frömmigkeit ’67, p. 58, on ParJer 9:7) ἐὰν μὴ γένησθε ὡς τὰ παιδία if you do not become child-like Mt 18:3. ὡς ἄγγελοί εἰσιν they are similar to angels 22:30. πᾶσα σὰρξ ὡς χόρτος 1 Pt 1:24. Cp. Mk 6:34; 12:25; Lk 22:26ab; Ro 9:27 (Is 10:22); 29a (Is 1:9a); 1 Cor 4:13; 7:7f, 29–31; 9:20f; 2 Pt 3:8ab (Ps 89:4); Rv 6:12ab al. (cp. GrBar 14:1 ἐγένετο φωνὴ ὡς βροντή). Sim. also ποίησόν με ὡς ἕνα τῶν μισθίων σου treat me like one of your day laborers Lk 15:19.—The adj. or adjectival expr. for which this form stands may be used as an attribute πίστιν ὡς κόκκον σινάπεως faith like a mustard seed=faith no greater than a tiny mustard seed Mt 17:20; Lk 17:6. προφήτης ὡς εἷς τῶν προφητῶν Mk 6:15. Cp. Ac 3:22; 7:37 (both Dt 18:15); 10:11; 11:5. ἐγένετο ὡς εἷς τῶν φευγόντων AcPl Ha 5, 18. ἀρνίον ὡς ἐσφαγμένον a lamb that appeared to have been slaughtered Rv 5:6.—In expressions like τρίχας ὡς τρίχας γυναικῶν 9:8a the second τρίχας can be omitted as self-evident (Ps 54:7 v.l.): ἡ φωνὴ ὡς σάλπιγγος 4:1; cp. 1:10; 9:8b; 13:2a; 14:2c; 16:3.
    ⓓ other noteworthy uses
    α. ὡς as can introduce an example ὡς καὶ Ἠλίας ἐποίησεν Lk 9:54 v.l.; cp. 1 Pt 3:6; or, in the combination ὡς γέγραπται, a scripture quotation Mk 1:2 v.l.; 7:6; Lk 3:4; Ac 13:33; cp. Ro 9:25; or even an authoritative human opinion Ac 17:28; 22:5; 25:10; or any other decisive reason Mt 5:48; 6:12 (ὡς καί).
    β. ὡς introduces short clauses: ὡς εἰώθει as his custom was Mk 10:1. Cp. Hs 5, 1, 2. ὡς λογίζομαι as I think 1 Pt 5:12. ὡς ἐνομίζετο as was supposed Lk 3:23 (Diog. L. 3, 2 ὡς Ἀθήνησιν ἦν λόγος [about Plato’s origin]; TestAbr A 5 p. 82, 32 [Stone p. 12] ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ; Just., A I, 6, 2 ὡς ἐδιδάχθημεν). ὡς ἦν as he was Mk 4:36. ὡς ἔφην Papias (2:15) (ApcMos 42; cp. Just., A I, 21, 6 ὡς προέφημεν).
    γ. The expr. οὕτως ἐστὶν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ ὡς ἄνθρωπος βάλῃ τὸν σπόρον Mk 4:26 may well exhibit colloquial syntax; but some think that ἄν (so one v.l. [=ἐάν, which is read by many mss.]) once stood before ἄνθρωπος and was lost inadvertently. S. the comm., e.g. EKlostermann, Hdb. z. NT4 ’50 ad loc.; s. also Jülicher, Gleichn. 539; B-D-F §380, 4; Mlt. 185 w. notes; Rdm.2 154; Rob. 928; 968.
    ③ marker introducing the perspective from which a pers., thing, or activity is viewed or understood as to character, function, or role, as
    ⓐ w. focus on quality, circumstance, or role
    α. as (JosAs 26:7 ἔγνω … Λευὶς … ταῦτα πάντα ὡς προφήτης; Just., A I, 7, 4 ἵνα ὡς ἄδικος κολάζηται) τί ἔτι κἀγὼ ὡς ἁμαρτωλὸς κρίνομαι; why am I still being condemned as a sinner? Ro 3:7. ὡς σοφὸς ἀρχιτέκτων 1 Cor 3:10. ὡς ἀρτιγέννητα βρέφη as newborn children (in reference to desire for maternal milk) 1 Pt 2:2. μή τις ὑμῶν πασχέτω ὡς φονεύς 4:15a; cp. b, 16.—1:14; 1 Cor 7:25; 2 Cor 6:4; Eph 5:1; Col 3:12; 1 Th 2:4, 7a.—In the oblique cases, genitive (ApcSed 16:2 ὡς νέου αὐτοῦ ἐπαράβλεπον τὰ πταίσματα αὐτοῦ; Just., A I, 14, 4 ὑμέτερον ἔστω ὡς δυνατῶν βασιλέων): τιμίῳ αἵματι ὡς ἀμνοῦ ἀμώμου Χριστοῦ with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish 1 Pt 1:19. δόξαν ὡς μονογενοῦς παρὰ πατρός glory as of an only-begotten son, coming from the Father J 1:14. Cp. Hb 12:27. Dative (Ath. 14, 2 θύουσιν ὡς θεοῖς; 28, 3 πιστεύειν ὡς μυθοποιῷ; Stephan. Byz. s.v. Κυνόσαργες: Ἡρακλεῖ ὡς θεῷ θύων): λαλῆσαι ὑμῖν ὡς πνευματικοῖς 1 Cor 3:1a; cp. bc; 10:15; 2 Cor 6:13; Hb 12:5; 1 Pt 2:13f; 3:7ab; 2 Pt 1:19. Accusative (JosAs 22:8 ἠγάπα αὐτὸν ὡς ἄνδρα προφήτην; Just., A I, 4, 4 τὸ ὄνομα ὡς ἔλεγχον λαμβάνετε; Tat. 27, 1 ὡς ἀθεωτάτους ἡμᾶς ἐκκηρύσσετε; Ath. 16, 4 οὐ προσκυνῶ αὐτὰ ὡς θεοὺς): οὐχ ὡς θεὸν ἐδόξασαν Ro 1:21; 1 Cor 4:14; 8:7; Tit 1:7; Phlm 16; Hb 6:19; 11:9. παρακαλῶ ὡς παροίκους καὶ παρεπιδήμους 1 Pt 2:11 (from the perspective of their conversion experience the recipients of the letter are compared to temporary residents and disenfranchised foreigners, cp. the imagery 1 Pt 1:19 above and s. παρεπίδημος and πάροικος 2).—This is prob. also the place for ὸ̔ ἐὰν ποιῆτε, ἐργάζεσθε ὡς τῷ κυρίῳ whatever you have to do, do it as work for the Lord Col 3:23. Cp. Eph 5:22. εἴ τις λαλεῖ ὡς λόγια θεοῦ if anyone preaches, (let the pers. do so) as if (engaged in proclaiming the) words of God 1 Pt 4:11a; cp. ibid. b; 2 Cor 2:17bc; Eph 6:5, 7.
    β. ὡς w. ptc. gives the reason for an action as one who, because (X., Cyr. 7, 5, 13 κατεγέλων τῆς πολιορκίας ὡς ἔχοντες τὰ ἐπιτήδεια; Appian, Liby. 56 §244 μέμφεσθαι τοῖς θεοῖς ὡς ἐπιβουλεύουσι=as being hostile; Polyaenus 2, 1, 1; 3, 10, 3 ὡς ἔχων=just as if he had; TestAbr B 8 p. 112, 17 [Stone p. 72] ὡς αὐτῷ ὄντι φίλῳ μου (do it for) him [Abraham] as a friend of mine; TestJob 17:5 καθʼ ἡμῶν ὡς τυραννούντων against us as though we were tyrants; ApcMos 23 ὡς νομίζοντες on the assumption that (we would not be discovered); Jos., Ant. 1, 251; Ath. 16, 1 ὁ δὲ κόσμος οὐχ ὡς δεομένου τοῦ θεοῦ γέγονεν; SIG 1168, 35); Paul says: I appealed to the Emperor οὐχ ὡς τοῦ ἔθνους μου ἔχων τι κατηγορεῖν not that I had any charge to bring against my (own) people Ac 28:19 (PCairZen 44, 23 [257 B.C.] οὐχ ὡς μενῶν=not as if it were my purpose to remain there). ὡς foll. by the gen. abs. ὡς τὰ πάντα ἡμῖν τῆς θείας δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ δεδωρημένης because his divine power has granted us everything 2 Pt 1:3. Cp. Dg. 5:16.—Only in isolated instances does ὡς show causal force when used w. a finite verb for, seeing that (PLeid 16, 1, 20; Lucian, Dial. Mort. 17, 2, end, Vit. Auct. 25; Aesop, Fab. 109 P.=148 H.; 111 H-H.: ὡς εὐθέως ἐξελεύσομαι=because; Tetrast. Iamb. 1, 6, 3; Nicetas Eugen. 6, 131 H. Cp. Herodas 10, 3: ὡς=because [with the copula ‘is’ to be supplied]) Mt 6:12 (ὡς καί as Mk 7:37 v.l.; TestDan 3:1 v.l.; the parallel Lk 11:4 has γάρ). AcPlCor 1:6 ὡς οὖν ὁ κύριος ἠλέησεν ἡμᾶς inasmuch as the Lord has shown us mercy (by permitting us). So, more oft., καθώς (q.v. 3).
    γ. ὡς before the predicate acc. or nom. w. certain verbs functions pleonastically and further contributes to the aspect of perspective ὡς προφήτην ἔχουσιν τὸν Ἰωάννην Mt 21:26. Cp. Lk 16:1. λογίζεσθαί τινα ὡς foll. by acc. look upon someone as 1 Cor 4:1; 2 Cor 10:2 (for this pass. s. also c below). Cp. 2 Th 3:15ab; Phil 2:7; Js 2:9.
    ⓑ w. focus on a conclusion existing only in someone’s imagination or based solely on someone’s assertion (PsSol 8:30; Jos., Bell. 3, 346; Just., A I, 27, 5; Mel., P. 58, 422) προσηνέγκατέ μοι τὸν ἄνθρωπον τοῦτον ὡς ἀποστρέφοντα τὸν λαόν, καὶ ἰδοὺ … you have brought this fellow before me as one who (as you claim) is misleading the people, and now … Lk 23:14. τί καυχᾶσαι ὡς μὴ λαβών; why do you boast, as though you (as you think) had not received? 1 Cor 4:7. Cp. Ac 3:12; 23:15, 20; 27:30. ὡς μὴ ἐρχομένου μου as though I were not coming (acc. to their mistaken idea) 1 Cor 4:18. ὡς μελλούσης τῆς πόλεως αἴρεσθαι assuming that the city was being destroyed AcPl Ha 5, 16.
    ⓒ w. focus on what is objectively false or erroneous ἐπιστολὴ ὡς διʼ ἡμῶν a letter (falsely) alleged to be from us 2 Th 2:2a (Diod S 33, 5, 5 ἔπεμψαν ὡς παρὰ τῶν πρεσβευτῶν ἐπιστολήν they sent a letter which purported to come from the emissaries; Diog. L. 10:3 falsified ἐπιστολαὶ ὡς Ἐπικούρου; Just., A, II, 5, 5 ὡς ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ σπορᾷ γενομένους υἱούς). τοὺς λογιζομένους ἡμᾶς ὡς κατὰ σάρκα περιπατοῦντας 2 Cor 10:2 (s. also aγ above). Cp. 11:17; 13:7. Israel wishes to become righteous οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως ἀλλʼ ὡς ἐξ ἔργων not through faith but through deeds (the latter way being objectively wrong) Ro 9:32 (Rdm.2 26f). ὡς ἐκ παραδόσεως ἀγράφου εἰς αὐτὸν ἥκοντα (other matters he recounts) as having reached him through unwritten tradition (Eus. about Papias) Papias (2:11).
    ④ conj., marker of result in connection with indication of purpose=ὥστε so that (Trag., Hdt.+, though nearly always w. the inf.; so also POxy 1040, 11; PFlor 370, 10; Wsd 5:12; TestJob 39:7; ApcMos 38; Jos., Ant. 12, 229; Just., A I, 56, 2; Tat. 12, 2. W. the indic. X., Cyr. 5, 4, 11 οὕτω μοι ἐβοήθησας ὡς σέσῳσμαι; Philostrat., Vi. Apoll. 8, 7 p. 324, 25f; Jos., Bell. 3, 343; Ath. 15, 3; 22, 2) Hb 3:11; 4:3 (both Ps 94:11). ὡς αὐτὸν καθόλου τὸ φῶς μὴ βλέπειν Papias (3:2) (s. φῶς 1a). ὡς πάντας ἄχθεσθαι (s. ἄχθομαι) AcPl Ha 4, 14. ὡς πάντας … ἀγαλλιᾶσθαι 6, 31 al.
    ⑤ marker of discourse content, that, the fact that after verbs of knowing, saying (even introducing direct discourse: Maximus Tyr. 5:4f), hearing, etc.=ὅτι that (X., An. 1, 3, 5; Menand., Sam. 590 S. [245 Kö.]; Aeneas Tact. 402; 1342; PTebt 10, 6 [119 B.C.]; 1 Km 13:11; EpArist; Philo, Op. M. 9; Jos., Ant. 7, 39; 9, 162; 15, 249 al.; Just., A I, 60, 2; Tat. 39, 2; 41, 1; Ath. 30, 4.—ORiemann, RevPhilol n.s. 6, 1882, 73–75; HKallenberg, RhM n.s. 68, 1913, 465–76; B-D-F §396) ἀναγινώσκειν Mk 12:26 v.l. (for πῶς); Lk 6:4 (w. πῶς as v.l.). μνησθῆναι Lk 24:6 (D ὅσα); cp. 22:61 (=Lat. quomodo, as in ms. c of the Old Itala; cp. Plautus, Poen. 3, 1, 54–56). ἐπίστασθαι (Jos., Ant. 7, 372) Ac 10:28; 20:18b v.l. (for πῶς). εἰδέναι (MAI 37, 1912, 183 [= Kl. T. 110, 81, 10] ἴστε ὡς [131/132 A.D.]) 1 Th 2:11a. μάρτυς ὡς Ro 1:9; Phil 1:8; 1 Th 2:10.—ὡς ὅτι s. ὅτι 5b.
    ⑥ w. numerals, a degree that approximates a point on a scale of extent, about, approximately, nearly (Hdt., Thu. et al.; PAmh 72, 12; PTebt 381, 4 [VSchuman, ClW 28, ’34/35, 95f: pap]; Jos., Ant. 6, 95; Ruth 1:4; 1 Km 14:2; TestJob 31:2; JosAs 1:6) ὡς δισχίλιοι Mk 5:13. Cp. 8:9; Lk 1:56; 8:42; J 1:39; 4:6; 6:10, 19; 19:14, 39; 21:8; Ac 4:4; 5:7, 36; 13:18, 20; 27:37 v.l. (Hemer, Acts 149 n. 140); Rv 8:1.
    ⑦ a relatively high point on a scale involving exclamation, how! (X., Cyr. 1, 3, 2 ὦ μῆτερ, ὡς καλός μοι ὁ πάππος! Himerius, Or. 54 [=Or. 15], 1 ὡς ἡδύ μοι τὸ θέατρον=how pleasant … ! Ps 8:2; 72:1; TestJob 7:12) ὡς ὡραῖοι οἱ πόδες τῶν εὐαγγελιζομένων ἀγαθά Ro 10:15 (cp. Is 52:7). Cp. 11:33. ὡς μεγάλη μοι ἡ σήμερον ἡμέρα GJs 19:2.
    ⑧ temporal conjunction (B-D-F §455, 2; 3; Harnack, SBBerlAk 1908, 392).
    ⓐ w. the aor. when, after (Hom., Hdt. et al.; Diod S 14, 80, 1; pap [POxy 1489, 4 al.]; LXX; TestAbr B 3 p. 107, 6 [Stone p. 62]; JosAs 3:2; ParJer 3:1; ApcMos 22; Jos., Bell. 1, 445b; Just., D. 2, 4; 3, 1) ὡς ἐπλήσθησαν αἱ ἡμέραι Lk 1:23. ὡς ἐγεύσατο ὁ ἀρχιτρίκλινος J 2:9.—Lk 1:41, 44; 2:15, 39; 4:25; 5:4; 7:12; 15:25; 19:5; 22:66; 23:26; J 4:1, 40; 6:12, 16; 7:10; 11:6, 20, 29, 32f; 18:6; 19:33; 21:9; Ac 5:24; 10:7, 25; 13:29; 14:5; 16:10, 15; 17:13; 18:5; 19:21; 21:1, 12; 22:25; 27:1, 27; 28:4. AcPl Ha 3, 20.
    ⓑ w. pres. or impf. while, when, as long as (Menand., Fgm. 538, 2 K. ὡς ὁδοιπορεῖς; Cyrill. Scyth. [VI A.D.] ed. ESchwartz ’39 p. 143, 1; 207, 22 ὡς ἔτι εἰμί=as long as I live) ὡς ὑπάγεις μετὰ τοῦ ἀντιδίκου σου while you are going with your opponent Lk 12:58. ὡς ἐλάλει ἡμῖν, ὡς διήνοιγεν ἡμῖν τὰς γραφάς while he was talking, while he was opening the scriptures to us 24:32.—J 2:23; 8:7; 12:35f ( as long as; cp. ἕως 2a); Ac 1:10; 7:23; 9:23; 10:17; 13:25; 19:9; 21:27; 25:14; Gal 6:10 ( as long as); 2 Cl 8:1; 9:7; IRo 2:2; ISm 9:1 (all four as long as).—ὡς w. impf., and in the next clause the aor. ind. w. the same subject (Diod S 15, 45, 4 ὡς ἐθεώρουν …, συνεστήσαντο ‘when [or ‘as soon as’] they noticed …, they put together [a fleet]’; SIG 1169, 58 ὡς ἐνεκάθευδε, εἶδε ‘while he was sleeping [or ‘when he went to sleep’] [in the temple] he saw [a dream or vision]’) Mt 28:9 v.l.; J 20:11; Ac 8:36; 16:4; 22:11.— Since (Soph., Oed. R. 115; Thu. 4, 90, 3) ὡς τοῦτο γέγονεν Mk 9:21.
    ⓒ ὡς ἄν or ὡς ἐάν w. subjunctive of the time of an event in the future when, as soon as.
    α. ὡς ἄν (Hyperid. 2, 43, 4; Herodas 5, 50; Lucian, Cronosolon 11; PHib 59, 1 [c. 245 B.C.] ὡς ἂν λάβῃς; UPZ 71, 18 [152 B.C.]; PTebt 26, 2. Cp. Witkowski 87; Gen 12:12; Josh 2:14; Is 8:21; Da 3:15 Theod.; Ath. 31, 3 [ἐάν Schwartz]) Ro 15:24; 1 Cor 11:34; Phil 2:23.
    β. ὡς ἐάν (PFay 111, 16 [95/96 A.D.] ὡς ἐὰν βλέπῃς) 1 Cl 12:5f; Hv 3, 8, 9; 3, 13, 2.
    ⓓ w. the superlative ὡς τάχιστα (a bookish usage; s. B-D-F §244, 1; Rob. 669) as quickly as possible Ac 17:15 (s. ταχέως 1c).
    ⑨ a final particle, expressing intention/purpose, with a view to, in order to
    ⓐ w. subjunctive (Hom.+; TestAbr A 4 p. 80, 33 [Stone p. 8]; SibOr 3, 130; Synes., Hymni 3, 44 [NTerzaghi ’39]) ὡς τελειώσω in order that I might finish Ac 20:24 v.l. (s. Mlt. 249).
    ⓑ w. inf. (X.; Arrian [very oft.: ABoehner, De Arriani dicendi genere, diss. Erlangen 1885 p. 56]; PGen 28, 12 [II A.D.]; ZPE 8, ’71, 177: letter of M. Ant. 57, cp. 44–46; 3 Macc 1:2; Joseph.; cp. the use of the opt. Just., D. 2, 3) Lk 9:52. ὡς τελειῶσαι Ac 20:24. ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν Hb 7:9 (s. ἔπος).
    ⓒ used w. prepositions to indicate the direction intended (Soph., Thu., X. [Kühner-G. I 472 note 1]; Polyb. 1, 29, 1; LRadermacher, Philol 60, 1901, 495f) πορεύεσθαι ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν Ac 17:14 v.l.—WStählin, Symbolon, ’58, 99–104. S. also ὡσάν, ὡσαύτως, ὡσεί 2, ὥσπερ b, ὡσπερεί, ὥστε 2b. DELG. M-M.

    Ελληνικά-Αγγλικά παλαιοχριστιανική Λογοτεχνία > ὡς

  • 8 Artificial Intelligence

       In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)
       Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)
       Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions....
       When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)
       4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, Eventually
       Just as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       Many problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)
       What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       [AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)
       The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)
       9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract Form
       The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)
       There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:
        Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins fly? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can fly, so robins probably can fly."
        Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)
       Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)
       Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)
       The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)
        14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory Formation
       It is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)
       We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.
       Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.
       Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.
    ... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)
       Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)
        16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular Contexts
       Even if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)
       Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        18) The Assumption That the Mind Is a Formal System
       Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial Intelligence
       The primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.
       The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)
       The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....
       AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)
        21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary Propositions
       In artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)
       Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)
       Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)
       The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Artificial Intelligence

  • 9 лежать в основе

    •

    The basis for the antibacterial effects of dyes is their ability to...

    •

    Behind the Mullard invention is the notion that...

    •

    Central to the theory is...

    •

    These equations form the basis (or foundation) of the theory of...

    •

    It is this form that provides the basis (or is fundamental) for a wide variety of TV antennas.

    •

    Boolean algebra underlies the theory of relations.

    •

    Microcomputers are at the heart of "transaction" telephones for checking customers' credit.

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    The general rule that the forces between two particles result from an exchange of other particles is basic to much of our present understanding of elementary-particle interactions.

    •

    The Periodic Table provides the framework for the whole study of inorganic chemistry.

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    Thermochemistry is basic to the study of chemical bonding.

    •

    An understanding of dye laser operation is a building block for understanding the principles of other tunable laser systems.

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    The chapter describes the fundamental physics that gives rise to the behaviour of the single junction and the transistor as circuit elements.

    •

    The nature of energy lies at the heart of the mystery of our existence.

    •

    This reaction is the basis for the cyanamide process for...

    * * *
    Лежать в основе -- to be at the heart of, to lie at the heart of; to be at the root of; to be at the basis of, to form the basis of, to form the basis for; to form the foundation for; to underlie
     Inference is al the heart of both language understanding and language generation.
     An accurate determination of primary flowrate lies at the heart of any turbine acceptance test.
     It is this particular approach that forms the basis of the dynamic testing technique described in this paper.
     Suppose that a single predicate underlies part of the meaning of each of the following sentences. (... лежит в основе части значения...)

    Русско-английский научно-технический словарь переводчика > лежать в основе

См. также в других словарях:

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  • Aristotle’s logic and metaphysics — Alan Code PART 1: LOGICAL WORKS OVERVIEW OF ARISTOTLE’S LOGIC The Aristotelian logical works are referred to collectively using the Greek term ‘Organon’. This is a reflection of the idea that logic is a tool or instrument of, though not… …   History of philosophy

  • metalogic — /met euh loj ik/, n. the logical analysis of the fundamental concepts of logic. [1835 45; META + LOGIC] * * * Study of the syntax and the semantics of formal languages and formal systems. It is related to, but does not include, the formal… …   Universalium

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